Introduction
Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs) have been at the center of a debate about whether they promote or discourage innovation. Some argue that they stimulate the market for technology and make the patent transaction more efficient (Geradin et al., 2011) . Also, PAEs may help small inventors who are usually less capable of enforcing patent rights against large patent infringers (Ronspies, 2004, Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004 ) because these entities specialize in patent enforcement (Cohen et al., 2014 , Shrestha, 2010 . For instance, Intellectual Ventures, the world largest PAE, claims to help small firms or individual inventors to earn revenue from their patents by buying and enforcing their patents against alleged patent infringers. Others, however, contend that PAEs discourage innovation by increasing firms' spending on frivolous litigation while not creating any value (Luman III and Dodson, 2006) nor stimulating market for technologies (Fischer and Henkel, 2012) . In support of this position, several studies have shown that the behavior of PAEs generate high social and private cost and, as a result, discourages innovation (Bessen et al., 2011 , Tucker, 2013 .
In response to concerns about the negative impact of PAEs, policymakers have tried to regulate PAEs (Cohen et al., 2014) . For instance, in the U.S, the so-called SHIELD Act also known as anti-patent troll act was proposed in 2013 and amended in 2014 (Yeh, 2012 to pass the bill. Besides legislation, a new patent intermediary, known as defensive patent aggregators (DPAs), have emerged as an alternative instrument to countering the rising threat of PAEs (Hagiu and Yoffie, 2013) . These entities identify the patents that can be purchased by PAEs and then, they buy those patents before the PAEs is able to obtain them. Technology practicing firms can obtain the license for the aggregated patents at zero or very low royalty rate if they subscribe to DPAs by paying membership fees. For instance, RPX Corporation provides the defensive patent aggregation service for its subscribers based on a membership program. Recently, some national governments have attempted to build their own state-run (or public-private partnership) DPAs in effort protect domestic manufacturing firms from the threat of PAEs. Intellectual Discovery of Korea, Patent Bank of Taiwan, and Innovation Network Corporation of Japan are examples of such attempts.
1 While technology companies increasingly subscribe to DPAs, it has yet to be empirically examined whether DPAs'
are effective in protecting the technology firms from the threat of PAEs. That is, do DPAs reduce the rising threat of PAEs?
This paper seeks the empirical answer to this question. First, we directly investigate the extent to which DPAs compete with PAEs in terms of patent aggregation. This paper is the first paper to quantitatively examine the effectiveness of the DPA business model in countering the threat of PAEs against technology practicing firms. Second, we show the particular business model of PAEs leads to the different behavior in the use of patents by investigating the litigation propensity of two different types of PAE, which may make the DPAs' operations for protecting the technology firms more difficult. We formulate five hypotheses based on the extant literature and build an analytical framework that models the patent aggregation decision making of PAEs and DPAs. We empirically test these five hypotheses with the U.S. patent reassignment dataset with the patent infringement litigation history. Our analysis shows that PAEs and DPAs aggregate substantially different patents. Also, the two different types of PAEs have a markedly different propensity of litigation for patent infringements. Following the analysis, we provide implications for policymakers to deal with the PAEs in a better way and suggest strategic implications for technology practicing firms that face the increasing threat of PAEs. Further, we draw implications for governments that plan to operate or are currently operating state-run DPAs to protect the domestic firms from the threat of PAEs.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In section 2, we review the literature on the emergence of patent intermediaries to manage patent infringement disputes of technology practicing firms. In Section 3, we derive related hypotheses and propose an analytical framework. Section 4 describes the dataset that we use for the empirical study. In section 5, we provide the results of our analysis and verify the hypotheses formulated in Section 3. In section 6 we describe our result. Section 7 concludes with remarks on policy implications and suggestions for a future research agenda.
Literature
Studies have examined the emergence of a variety of patent intermediaries that seek to mitigate technology practicing firms' patent infringement risk. A well-known entity is the PAE, also known as a patent troll, or more broadly, a Non-Practicing Entity (NPE). There are wide variations in the definition of PAEs. Some argue that NPE and PAE are conceptually distinct as typical technology intermediaries fall into NPE. Therefore, the concept of NPE is broader than the concept of PAE Meurer, 2013, Schwartz and Kesan, 2013) . Others claim that definitional borders of PAE and NPE are not clear. For instance, even a typical technology broker that is NPE by definition may behave like a PAE (Cohen et al., 2014) . We define, in this paper, PAE as an entity that externally acquires patents not for their use but to enforce alleged patent infringers to extract rent from them.
Recent studies provide deeper insight into how PAEs works and distinctions in their business strategies. Morton and Shapiro (2014) (Hagiu and Yoffie, 2013) . These unique business models increasingly draw the attention of technology firms as the threat of PAEs rise. This business model, however, has some potential problems.
First, once the DPA has acquired a portfolio of patents, the incentives for the technology firms to subscribe to DPA might be low. That is, once a DPA acquires set of patents, non-member companies that potentially infringe on the patent also can avoid the patent infringement dispute because the DPA will likely never file lawsuits to the alleged patent infringers. DPA uses the "catch-and-release" strategy to address this issue (Wang, 2010, Hagiu and Yoffie, 2013) . That is, once an aggregated patent is licensed to its member companies, the DPA resells the patent to PAEs. However, whether this strategy works is not clear yet.
Second, a DPA may spend too much cost to purchase patents. In patent transaction negotiations with the patentee, the original patentee can substantially raise the price of the patent if the DPA is exposed as patent buyer. Aside from these issues, the effectiveness of their operations in mitigating the PAE-risk to technology firms has not been empirically examined (Hagiu and Yoffie, 2013 These new patent intermediaries engage in massive patent aggregation for two major purposes: for the defensive or offensive use of patents. As they are recently emerged entities, our empirical understanding of their behavior, particularly about what patents are being aggregated by them is highly limited.
Hypotheses Development
The hypotheses in this study are related to two factors: the differences in the patent aggregation timing and the characteristics of the patents aggregated by PAEs and DPAs.
A patent that is involved in an infringement dispute signals information regarding the ease with which it may be disputed because patent litigation serves as an important information transmission channel about the legal validity of patents (Choi, 1998) . A DPA might target buying such apparently problematic patents to protect subscribers from future disputes associated with the patent. If the patent is already disputed against subscribers of a DPA, the DPA still has an incentive to purchase the patent to resolve the dispute.
In contrast, a PAE has little incentive to acquire such problematic patents. The patent enforcement entity makes their patents as invisible as possible for effective attack against patent infringers (Pénin, 2012 , Reitzig et al., 2007 . This is because once a patent is involved in a patent infringement case, technology practicing firms that are likely to infringe upon the patent are informed to avoid probable legal disputes about the patent. For instance, the potential patent infringers may attempt to "invent-around", license alternative patent, or change the design of service/products even though these options require some cost.
Therefore, for PAEs, aggregating disputed patents would marginalize the expected benefit of the patent enforcement. As a result, the PAEs are unlikely to aggregate revealed-problematic patents. This rationale formulates the first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. Patents that have not been previously disputed are more likely to be purchased by PAEs than
DPAs
We develop an analytical framework to derive hypotheses about the characteristics of aggregated patents by PAEs and DPAs. We construct our analytical framework based on the theoretical model of Galasso and Schankerman (2010) for constructing the part of dispute settlement process and Galasso et al. (2013) for capturing the strategic action of patentee against patent infringers with the purchased patents.
Suppose that there is a technology firm (A) that would infringe upon a patent at probability (t). Once the patent infringement occurs, the patentee can sue A or offer a settlement. If the case is settled, the patentee obtains a certain share ( ) of the market profit ( ) of A. If the patentee files a lawsuit, the patentee and the alleged infringer pays litigation cost (C) and the case goes through the two-stage decision processes of the court. First, the court finds whether the disputed patent is valid. The probability of the patent is validated at probability (q). Second, if the patent is valid, the court issues an injunction and enforces the infringer to pay damage (D) at probability , or enforces the infringer to pay damage only at probability 1-.
Let us consider a situation where a PAE decides to buy a patent from the original inventor. We assume that the fair price of the patent (V) is determined by the technical value of the patents and the PAE can buy the patents at V. The PAE would buy the patent only if the expected payoff of buying the patent exceeds the expected payoff of "not-buying". The expected payoff of suing A is calculated as qD C V and the payoff of settlement is given as V. . Practically, the member companies would not subscribe to the DPA if the membership fee and cost for litigation exceed the expected loss by the litigation. Under these conditions, the feasible set of patents that are attractive to DPA and PAE can be visualized as Figure1.
Figure 1. Set of patents that can be aggregated by PAEs and DPAs
The horizontal axis corresponds to the validity of the patent, and the vertical axis represents the fair value of the patent which is determined by the technical value of the patent. There are three distinctive regions in the graph. The shaded area marked as "DPA only" corresponds to the set of patents that can be aggregated only by DPA. Likewise, the "PAE only" region is for the set of patents that are only attractive to PAE for aggregation. The "competitive acquisition" region represents the set of patents that can be targeted by both of PAE and DPA. The payoff PAE from the successful settlement or litigation solely becomes PAE's profit. On the other hand, the DPA's maximum expected profit from patent aggregation is confined to the membership fee that is not associated with the member company's cost or benefit from patent infringement disputes. Therefore, PAE is willing to pay more money and acquire more valuable patents than DPA.
Figure1 also shows that the PAE is likely to aggregate patents that have validity above a cutoff while the DPA is not. Intuitively, the PAE would not buy the patents that cannot give credible threat against alleged patent infringers because the low credible threat will result in an unsuccessful settlement or lawsuit.
The credibility of threat would be positively associated with the patent's validity. Hence, the PAE would seek the patents that have relatively high validity. This observation leads to the third hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3. The patents that are aggregated by PAEs have higher validity than the DPAs' patents
When we map the feasible set of aggregated patents on the uncertainty-technical value axis, both of PAE and DPA are willing to acquire the patents that have all the possible ranges of the uncertainties.
Therefore, PAE and DPA would have no significant difference in the uncertainty of the acquired patents. Consortium. Rockstar Consortium was originally a consortium of technology practicing companies seeking to acquire Nortel's patent portfolio. It enforced the acquired patents to the technology firms that were not the members of the consortium. These PAEs can be distinguished from the PAE that operate independently (Private PAEs). We refer to this type of PAE as corporate PAE. The corporate PAE will take into account not only own revenue but also the revenue of the cooperating technology firms in taking action against alleged patent infringers. They might share the obtained profit from the enforcing patents against alleged patent infringers with the cooperating downstream firms (Morton and Shapiro, 2014) . In this sense, injunction would be the preferable outcome of litigation to the "damage award only" for the corporate PAE while the injunction does not provide additional profit for the private PAE. This is because the technology firms behind the corporate PAE can impose huge cost with the injunction relief to the infringer in market operation if the infringer is competing in the downstream market. Indeed, Somaya (2003) explains that injunction becomes an attractive option in litigation because the patentee would not allow its competitor to enter into the commercial space of the patent. This aspect is captured by our model. Suppose that an infringer's market share is taken by the cooperating technology firm of the PAE if the infringer is driven out from the market as a result of the lawsuit. Particularly, this scenario is likely to be realized by the injunction. This benefit is internalized in the propensity of litigation of the PAEs. More specifically, the expected payoff of suing the alleged infringer is bigger than that of private PAE. For instance, assume that the market revenue of the alleged patent infringers is taken over by the cooperating technology firms with the PAE if the infringer exits the market. Suppose that the corporate PAE receives while the technology firms behind it obtain if the court issues injunction relief with the damage award, and the infringer is driven out from the market as a result. Then, the likelihood of suing the patent infringer is can be presented as Pr q D C . This is bigger than Pr qD C which is the likelihood of suing alleged infringers of the private PAE. Therefore:
Hypothesis 5. Corporate PAEs are more likely to sue alleged patent infringers than private PAEs.
Data

Dataset
To test these hypotheses, we use patent reassignment data to identify the ownership transferred patent as employed by Serrano (2010) and Galasso and Schankerman (2013) . We build a dataset that includes reassigned U.S patents to ten large PAEs and three DPAs. Our dataset contains general patent statistics and information about patent infringement lawsuit that each patent was involved.
PAEs and DPAs:
In constructing our set of PAE, we begin with the list of NPEs provided by patentfreedom.com, which ranks NPEs by number of patents owned. However, not all NPEs fall into our definition of PAE because the patentfreedom.com defines the NPE as "any entity that enforce or effort to license owning patents while not practicing them". According to this definition, any technology developing entities that do not engage in external patent acquisition but enforce the owned patents against alleged patent infringers are included. Thus, we select the NPEs that satisfy the following two criteria.  The NPEs that have purchased more than five USPTO patents.
 The NPEs that sued technology firm for patent infringement with an externally acquired patent.
These conditions exclude NPEs that have not purchased U.S patents or NPEs that have acquired U.S patents from others but did not file the lawsuits with the patents. Applying these conditions leaves us with ten PAEs.
For DPAs, we do not include patent pools or patent pledges such as Defensive Patent License or Open Innovation Network because they do not purchase patents from others but rather mediate the cross-licensing or patent portfolio sharing between technology practicing firms. Even though these entities might defend technology firms from patent infringement lawsuits, they do not engage in patent aggregation competition with PAEs. We were able to identify three DPAs that purchased more than five U.S patents.
Aggregated Patents:
We search for the reassigned U.S-granted patents to the 10 PAEs and three DPAs from the USPTO patent reassignment database (http://assignement.uspto.gov). We limit the sample to the We obtain the patent infringement case information from the patent litigation database provided by RPX Corporation (https://search.rpxcorp.com). Because the patents right duration is limited to 20 years in the U.S, and pure external patent acquisition would occur after the patent application is published, we exclude patents that have been reassigned before the publication year or after the patent expiry. For additional identification of the type of patent transaction, we categorize assignors into "individual inventor", "company", and "university" type manually. 
Variables
We use two dependent variables. The first is "aggregated by PAE" that takes 1 if the patent was aggregated by a PAE. The patents aggregated by DPAs take a value of 0. We use this variable to test the hypotheses 1-4. The second dependent variable is "plaintiff" that has 1 if the entity sued someone for patent infringement with the acquired patent. We use this variable to test the hypothesis 5.
We define five independent variables. "Aggregated before litigation" is a dummy variable that takes 1 if the patent was aggregated before patent infringement lawsuits (if any). This variable is employed to test hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 1 anticipates a positive coefficient.
We use "five-year forward citation excluding self-citation" to test the hypothesis 2. The times cited by subsequent patents during a confined period excluding the self-citation is employed as a measurement of the technical impact of the patent in many prior studies (Albert et al., 1991 , Trajtenberg, 1990 , Trajtenberg et al., 1997 . Hypothesis 2 expects a positive coefficient.
We compute the share of non-patent literature (NPL) references to the sum of the total number of cited NPL and patents as a measurement of "validity of the patents" (Cockburn and MacGarvie, 2009 ). The higher the NPL share, the greater the validity of the patent. This variable becomes the independent variable for testing hypothesis 3. Hypothesis 3 expects a positive coefficient. Cockburn and MacGarvie (2009) use the ratio of the number of independent claims to the number of cited patents as a measurement of the "uncertainty in the scope of patent claims" based on two prior studies (Allison et al., 2003, Bessen and Meurer, 2006) . Lanjouw and Schankerman (1997) also use this metric to measure a patent's likelihood of being infringed. Following these studies, we use this ratio as the measurement of "uncertainty in the scope of the claim." The higher the value, the greater the uncertainty which is positively associated with the likelihood of being infringed. Hypothesis 4 is a null hypothesis that anticipates a coefficient is 0. "Corporate PAE" is a binary variable that takes 1 if the aggregator is categorized as Corporate PAE but 0 otherwise. This variable is used to test the hypothesis 5. We set Private PAE as the reference group.
Hypothesis 5 expects a positive coefficient.
We control for other patent characteristics. Backward citations refer to the number of cited prior patents contained in the patent application documents. Backward citations proxy for a variety of patent characteristics. First, backward citation counts indicate the amount of relevant technology in the technology field (Ziedonis, 2004) and the scope of the patent (Harhoff et al., 2003) . The more the cited patents, the clearer the definition of the property right of the patentee (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001 ). The backward citation also relates to patent quality (Harhoff et al., 2003 , Reitzig, 2003 . All these dimensions are relevant to the size of prior art of the patent of interest. We introduce backward citations to control for the size of prior arts of the patents. We do not introduce backward citations in testing hypothesis 3 and 4 because the validity and uncertainty are computed by the backward citation.
The Number of cited NPL proxies for the intensity of science-linkage that patented inventions have (Meyer, 2000 , Schmoch, 1993 , Verbeek et al., 2002 . We control for the science-linkage effect in testing all hypotheses except for hypothesis 2 because validity is computed by the backward citation and NPL.
We control for the scope of technological fields of the patent with the number of assigned IPC subclasses and the jurisdictional coverage of the patent with the size of the patent family (Harhoff et al., 2003) . The broader the scope of technological fields, the higher the likelihood of being cited by consecutive patents because of the increased probability of being cited by patents in the broader technological fields.
Also, broader jurisdictional and technological coverage is associated with higher expected economic benefit from the use of patents as well as an increased possibility of patent infringement disputes.
We introduce a set of dummy variables for publication year and patent aggregation year, setting 1995 and 2008 as the reference years respectively. We also control for the fixed effect of technology field that is related to the patent of interest by using the primary IPC subclass of the patent with the IPC-Technology concordance matrix provided by World Intellectual Property Organization 6 . Table 2 summarizes the variables and descriptions. where is the probability of a given patent was aggregated by PAE, IV is independent variable of interest, is a constant term, C are the control variables, and an error term. Figure 2 depicts the distribution of the technology field corresponded to the primary IPC of patents of PAEs and DPAs. Interestingly, electrical engineering patents were the primary target for acquisition of both of PAEs and DPAs. Given that ICT and electronics are used in many complex products, it is relatively difficult for technology firms in theses sectors to monitor what existing patents are related to the products or services that they plan to sell. This difficulty often leads to inadvertent patent infringement (Merges and Nelson, 1990 , Kash and Kingston, 2001 , Reitzig et al., 2007 , Ziedonis, 2004 . Hence, the patent aggregators are likely to target ICT and electronics patents. This is consistent with the study of Fisher and Henkel (2012).
Results
Summary Statistics
Figure 2. Industrial Profile of the aggregated Patents
We conduct the Variation Inflation Factor (VIF 7 ) test to check for issues of multicollinearity. The means of VIF values take below 2 across all the regression models. Accordingly, our analysis is unlikely to be characterized by issues of multicollinearity. Family Size 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00** 
Hypotheses Tests
(1) PAEs vs. DPAs Table 5 presents the regression analysis results for hypothesis 1-4. For each hypothesis, we run three different models: the full sample, a sample limited to patent transactions with company or university-type assignor, a sample limited to patents that were transacted with companies-type assignors. The three specifications seek to take into account the probable impact from the type of patent seller. The first three columns report the test result for hypothesis 1. The coefficients of aggregated before the litigation are positive and significant at the 0.01 level across all the models. The patents that were not involved in prior lawsuits are more likely to be aggregated by PAEs than DPAs. This result supports hypothesis 1.
Test results for the hypothesis 2 are given in columns 4-6. The coefficients of forward citation is positive and significant at the 0.01 significance level across all three models. These results support the second hypothesis that the patents that are aggregated by PAEs have higher technical value than DPAs' patents.
Test results for the hypothesis 3 are given in columns 7-9. We regress the aggregated by PAEs on the validity with other control variables. The coefficients of validity are positive and significant at the 0.01 level across all three models. These results support the third hypothesis that the patents that were aggregated by PAEs have higher validity than the DPAs' patents.
Columns 10-12 report the regression test for hypothesis 4. Across all the three models, the coefficients of the uncertainty measurements are positive and significant at the 0.01 significance level.
These results reject the hypothesis 4.
(2) Corporate PAEs vs. Private PAEs
The dependent variable used to test hypothesis 5 is whether the PAEs litigated alleged patent infringers with the aggregated patents. Accordingly, we limit the sample to the patents that were aggregated by PAEs.
We then regress the dependent variable on the Corporate PAE dummy variable. The reference group is set to private PAEs' patents. 
Robustness Checks
We check the robustness of our findings in the following ways. First, a single dominant patent aggregator's patents might bias the result. In our sample, Intellectual Ventures (IVs) aggregated the largest volume of patents. Furthermore, IVs recently diversified its business model so as to begin investing in startups, university researches, and providing the defensive patent aggregation services as typical DPAs do (Hagiu and Yoffie, 2013) . Thus, IVs' patents might have a different patent aggregation pattern from that of a typical PAE. To address this concern, we run the regressions with the same specifications excluding IVs' patents from the sample. Our findings still hold at 0.01 significance level. The second concern is that the test result for hypothesis 5 might be sensitive to the classification scheme of PAEs into either corporate PAE or private PAE. To address this concern, we reclassify the PAEs into the two types with an alternative scheme. Mosaid Technologies and Interdigital are the U.S stock market listed PAEs. If the major shareholders of these PAEs are technology practicing firms, they might behave like corporate PAEs. To take account of this possibility, we code Mosaid Technologies, Interdigital, Intellectual Ventures, and Rockstar Consortium into corporate PAEs, while categorizing the remaining PAEs as private PAEs. The coefficient of corporate PAEs are still positive at 0.01 significance level. Last, the regression with standard logit for the hypothesis 5 might be subject to the rare event problem (King and Zeng, 2001 ) because litigated patents in the sample represent only 2.57% of the sample. Firth (1993) suggests a solution to the rare-event issue using a penalized maximum likelihood based technique. The coefficient of corporate PAE rarely changes. We report the regression results for these robustness checks in the appendix section.
Discussion
Our study sheds empirical light on the patent aggregation strategies of PAEs and DPAs. Our analysis shows that PAEs and DPAs aggregate different types of patents.
PAEs are more likely to aggregate patents that were not involved in prior patent infringement lawsuits.
If a technology practicing firm knows that a particular patent may be easily infringed, the firm will find a way to avoid probable legal disputes from the patent. Thus, for PAEs, aggregating previously litigated patents reduces the number of potential patent infringers and the expected profit accordingly. Considering this effect, PAEs appear to aggregate patents that are the revealed as problematic but can be infringed upon by technology practicing firms. Reitzig et al.(2007) shows that the patent enforcement entity has a strong incentive to make their patents as invisible as possible. Similarly, PAEs would be unlikely to aggregate patents that were involved in prior patent infringement lawsuits.
In contrast, DPAs aggregate litigation-involved patents for two reasons. First, DPAs consider previously litigated patents as indicating an increased likelihood that these patents that will generate further legal disputes against technology practicing firms. DPAs thus have an incentive to aggregate these high risk patents to protect their subscribing companies. Second, if a patent is litigated against a DPA's subscribers, the DPA will try to aggregate the disputed patents from the patent holder to resolve the disputes.
As we hypothesized, PAEs are more likely to aggregate patents that have higher technical values than DPAs. Considering the fact that PAEs aggregate higher quality patents as compared to technology practicing firms (Fischer and Henkel, 2012) , our analysis shows that PAEs selectively aggregate highly valuable patents at a higher rate than other types of patent buying entities. Our analytical model explains the holding of patents of higher technical value in PAEs' compared to DPAs. However, PAEs may aggregate these high-quality patents for a different reason, which is not captured in our model. The higher the technological value of the patents, the stronger the bargaining power of the patentee in settlement of the patent infringement dispute because the patented technologies are likely to be crucial to the (potential) infringer's product or services. PAEs will likely leverage this strong bargaining power to extract more rent from the alleged patent infringers. Thus, the PAEs would have a greater incentive to seek such patents when compared to DPAs.
Our analysis has shown that PAEs' patents have higher legal validity than those of DPA. Our analytical model explains this observation using a credible threat explanation. If the validity of a given patent is not high enough, the threat against the alleged patent infringers may not be credible. If the threat is not credible, neither dispute settlement nor bringing suite against the alleged patent infringer are viable. Another explanation (not captured in our model) is that if the patent is invalidated during the lawsuit, PAEs lose potential business opportunities to use the patent against other alleged patent infringers. To reduce such patent invalidation risk, patents that have high legal validity are likely to be aggregated by PAEs over DPAs.
Patents with relatively high uncertainty in the scope of claims are more likely to be aggregated by PAEs over DPAs, which contradicts hypothesis 4. Our model anticipated no significant difference in the uncertainty of the scope of the aggregated patents by DPAs and PAEs. Here we suggest a potential explanation for this result. The higher the uncertainty, the greater the likelihood of patent infringement.
Given that the original patent owner knows this, the bargaining position of the patent owner may be stronger than the potential buyer in the negotiation in the patent transaction. Therefore, the degree of uncertainty might be positively associated with the premium of the patent when selling it. PAEs may be more willing to pay the patent premium associated with such uncertainty because a larger portion of their expected profit is associated with the patent's use as compared to DPAs who derive their revenue based solely on the membership fee of subscribers. Therefore, the PAEs are more willing to pay greater price to acquire the highly uncertain patents as compared to DPAs. This explanation is supported by our dataset in that the DPAs do not purchase patents with uncertainty above a certain level, while PAEs purchased patents at all the possible ranges of uncertainty.
Our analysis shows that corporate PAEs are significantly more likely to file lawsuits than private PAEs.
Corporate PAEs might take into account not only damage awards but also the benefit of the technology firms that cooperate with the corporate PAE. Simply put, a corporate PAE can be thought of as an agent of the cooperating technology firms in the aggressive use of patents against its competitors. In contrast, the private PAEs would not have additional benefits from suing the alleged patent infringers other than the damage award. Hence, the relative likelihood of suing the patent infringer would be higher for the corporate PAEs than DPAs.
Suing of competitors through PAEs may also be beneficial for technology firms cooperating with PAEs.
Infringement disputes between technology firms can be settled through cross-licensing (Choi, 2010 , Shapiro, 2003 . However, if technology firms sue the alleged infringers through PAEs, they may not be subject to cross-licensing settlements because the litigator is a non-practicing entity.
Conclusions
Based on our analysis, we argue that DPAs do not compete with PAEs for patent aggregation. This observation leads to a conclusion that DPAs might not be enough to protect technology practicing firms from the threat of PAEs. PAEs aggregate patents that have high technical value, validity, uncertainty, and that were not previously disputed. On the other hand, DPAs aggregate previously disputed patents and those that have a lower technical value, degree of legal validity, and uncertainty. Hence, PAEs still can impose significant threats to technology firms. This conclusion is in the line with the conclusion that the patent right assertion business would be sustainable (Fischer and Henkel, 2012 , Henkel and Reitzig, 2008 , Reitzig et al., 2010 .
Our findings have implications for policymakers concerned about the issues of PAEs. First, introduction of policy response to the PAE issues is still necessary because DPAs do not fully address the PAE threat.
Second, for state-run DPAs, we argue that simply mimicking the patent aggregation strategy or business model of existing defensive patent aggregation services would not effectively protect technology practicing firms from the threat of PAEs. Our empirical study provides hints about what patents should be targeted by DPAs. More practically, because the differences in the aggregated patents between DPAs and PAEs stem from the revenue structure associated with patent purchasing, government might need to subsidize the operation of the DPAs.
The difference that we find between corporate PAEs and private PAEs in the propensity to sue alleged patent infringers allows technology firms to build better negotiation strategies in legal dispute settlements with PAEs. If a technology firm is involved in a patent infringement dispute with a corporate PAE, the technology firm might need to find the firms behind the PAE rather than directly engaging in the lawsuit or settlement negotiation. Negotiating directly with the cooperating technology firms would likely help to find a better position in resolving the disputes. Towards this end, the technology firms may benefit by strengthening their monitoring functions on relationship between their rival and PAEs.
Our research has several limitations and provides future research opportunities. First, our conclusion is based on the patents that were aggregated by selected PAEs and DPAs. Also, our sample consists of U.S patents only. Even though the selected PAEs and DPAs are the major patent aggregators and the U.S is the major destination of patenting as well as for patent-oriented business, conclusions in the present study are potentially subject to limitations regarding generalizability. Future studies might analyze more cases to increase generalizability.
Second, as another way to obtain patents, PAEs and DPAs sometimes obtain exclusive licenses from the original patentees rather than purchasing the patents themselves. Our dataset does not capture this alternative route of obtaining the patent rights. Therefore, our dataset is potentially subject to selection bias.
However, license contract are not usually disclosed because reporting it is not enforced by law. For this reason, we argue that our dataset is the best available data source for our study.
Third, our empirical findings suggest that the constructed analytical framework needs to be improved.
It fails to correctly predict the difference in the uncertainty of patents between PAEs and DPAs. We hope the future study can refine the analytical model to fully explain the difference in the uncertainty while addressing the suggested hypothetic explanations in the discussion sections.
Finally, the emergence of new patent intermediaries raises interesting questions regarding the direction of technology firm strategy. For example, some technology firms subscribe only to defensive patent aggregation services, while others cooperate with PAEs at the same time. Examining how technology firms strategically employ those patent aggregators and how the patent aggregation service influence the IP strategy of technology firms, would help one to understand the dynamics created by the emergence of PAEs and DPAs.
Regression without Intellectual Ventures' patents
(1) Hypothesis1-4 
